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SESSION 13
EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law
The George Washington University
I. WINDS OF WAR? UNCERTAIN TIMES.
On a somber note, the New Year – and new decade – began with another (relatively modest, but still
anxiety-producing) deployment of troops to the Middle East, following larger deployments during 2019. Conference attendees have become accustomed to the fact that today, federal procurement – of services, goods,
construction, and research – supports and is critical to every conceivable government (and military) function.
Yet mobilization (or, with a nod to Section 809 Panel Chair, David Drabkin, a manifestation of war footing)
tends to draw attention to and crystallize (in the minds of policy-makers, legislators, leaders, and, of course, the
media and the public) the importance of the acquisition function. See, inter alia, CRS Reviews Latest Overseas
DOD Contractor Numbers, 61 GC ¶ 151 (noting that “contractor employees accounted for 50 percent or more
of the total [DoD] presence during recent U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.... [C]ontractors
have outnumbered U.S. troops in Afghanistan for the past eight years. In 2018, there were more than twice as
many contractors as U.S. troops in Afghanistan. These contractors provided supplies and services, including
security, logistical support, weapons, equipment maintenance, intelligence communications, transportation,
construction and base support operations.”); Heidi M. Peters & Sofia Plagakis, Congressional Research Service Report R44115, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018
(Updated, May 10, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44116.pdf. Time will tell what impact, if any, recent
events will have on defense procurement, defense spending, homeland security, etc. See, e.g., Aaron Mehta,
Valerie Insinna & David B. Larter, What Soulemani’s death might mean for the National Defense Strategy
and the next budget, Defense News (January 4, 2020). See also, generally, J. Alex Ward and Victoria Dalcourt
Angle, Feature Comment: Contracting In The Fog Of War, 61 GC ¶ 120 (noting that, among other things, “if a
war risk is truly outside the scope of the parties’ agreement, a cardinal change theory might be available[, but
it is difficult to assert] claims for war risks where the contract shows that the contractor accepted those risks.”)
Against that backdrop, as was the case last year, we’re not particularly confident in predicting what is in
store for 2020 and beyond. There’s not much precedent for governance while the impeachment process is playing out, in an election year, with the incumbent facing no meaningful competition and, thus, all but assured a
major party nomination, compounded by a deeply divided legislature. The rapidly spinning news cycle remains
exhausting, overwhelming, and stressful. Three years into the current administration, we should be fully accustomed to the vacancy and turnover rates in high level (e.g., up to, and including, cabinet level), politicallyappointed leadership. (On a positive note, we currently have both an Administrator of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy, Michael Wooten, and a Secretary of Defense, Mark T. Esper.) Yet it seems quaint to aspire
to stable leadership and staffing, reliable appropriations and program funding, and proactive, meaningful, efficient long-term reform. All of which only increases anxiety in the government contracting policy and practice
spheres, because uncertainty and instability threaten or undercut, among other things, efforts to engage in
effective tradeoff analyses and planning, making efficient, long-term investment decisions, maintaining healthy
contractual relationships, proactively investing in hiring, developing, and training personnel (needed today
and in the future), while, instead, permitting a regressive overemphasis on cost savings rather than focusing
on programmatic outcomes as a principal goal of the acquisition process. None of which breeds optimism.
II. NEW ELECTRONIC TOOLS … AND ACRONYMS: A NEW GPE, AND SAMMI’S.
Although none of it was unexpected, last year prompted an unusual number of technology-based
changes to some of the most fundamental ways that we do business.
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A. Governmentwide Point of Entry (GPE)? RIP FedBizOpps? On
November 12, the General Services Administration (GSA) announced that: “Effective [today], FBO.gov [Federal Business Opportunities] is retired, and Beta.
SAM.gov is now the authoritative source for Contract Opportunities. Visit the
Learning Center for videos, FAQs and other information!” Alas, the transition
may not have been as smooth as GSA anticipated. For example, as of the first
of the calendar year, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 2.101 definition
of Governmentwide point of entry (GPE) still pointed to FedBizOpps, www.fbo.
gov, which led to the page that explained: “FBO.gov has been moved to beta.
SAM.gov and is now known as Contract Opportunities. beta.SAM.gov is now
the authoritative location for finding contract opportunities.” Is anyone else
troubled that the official, central, mandatory repository and access point for all
things federal procurement – relied upon by government officials and contractors (domestic and foreign) was launched in beta mode and still bears a beta
moniker? As GSA explains: “The beta.SAM.gov domains contain data that has
been migrated from our legacy systems. The domains support two distinct types
of federal awards: acquisition and federal assistance.” FAR 2.101 also currently
states that the “Single, Governmentwide point of entry,” means the one point of
entry to be designated by the Administrator of OFPP that will allow the private
sector to electronically access procurement opportunities Governmentwide.”
B. Goodbye DUNS, Hellos SAMMI’s. Through a related yet different
initiative, GSA is transitioning from its long-term, exclusive reliance on the
(Dun & Bradstreet (D&B)-based) Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS)
as the Unique Entity Identifier (UEI) for contractor identification and registration in the System for Award Management (SAM). Contractors (and prospective
contractors) will now self-identify using the far more fun-to-say SAM Managed
Identifiers (SAMMI’s), with Ernst & Young initially providing the validation
services. These newfangled SAMMI’s, of course, should not be confused with the
oh-so-coveted Sammies (or Samuel J. Heyman Service to America Medals), known
in federal circles as the “Oscars” of government service. See, generally, https://
servicetoamericamedals.org/about/. Developments In Brief: GSA Begins Transition
from DUNS Numbers to SAMMI, 61 GC ¶ 93(a); https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/
newsroom/news-releases/gsa-announces-award-for-entity-validation-services; see
also, Done with DUNS, https://gsa.federalschedules.com/blog/done-with-duns/.
C. What’s Next? The Electronic Marketplace Initiative. In tangentially
related news, in 2020, we’ll be watching GSA’s developmental efforts regarding
the electronic marketplace initiative, pursuant to Section 846 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018, Public Law No. 115-91, 41 U.S.C. § 1901
note. This topic is discussed at greater length, in Chris Yukins’ materials found
at Chapter 2. See also, Christopher Yukins, Feature Comment: U.S. Government
To Award Billions Of Dollars In Contracts To Open Electronic Marketplaces To
Government Customers—Though Serious Questions Remain, 61 GC ¶ 303 (“It
is difficult to gauge how large these electronic marketplaces may grow. ... The
new electronic marketplaces thus may ‘swallow’ a large portion of the bottom
tiers of the $550 billion federal market.”); see also GSA Commercial Platforms
Initiative, https://interact.gsa.gov/group/commercial-platforms-initiative.
III. NEW LEADERSHIP AT THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT POLICY; THE ACQUISITION
WORKFORCE (AND OTHER PRIORITIES).
A. Finally, An OFPP Administrator. Following an August 1 Senate
confirmation vote, for the first time since September of 2016 (a gap just short
© 2020 Thomson Reuters
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of three years), the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) is again being led by a Senate-confirmed administrator, Michael Wooten. We applaud
the administration’s appointment, turning to someone with experience from
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), senior service in the District of Columbia’s procurement office, and, among other things, military service (as a
Marine). Developments: President Nominates OFPP Head, 61 GC ¶ 55(c). Seen
as a largely apolitical appointee, in addition to emphasizing his commitment
to the acquisition workforce, Administrator Wooten has among other things,
referred to initiatives intended to leverage the government’s buying power
(through, e.g., category management), sharing market intelligence, data (including performance assessment and artificial intelligence), cybersecurity
(addressed at greater length in Chapter 16 of these materials), and seeking
to innovate and generate cost efficiency. See also, Vernon J. Edwards, At Long
Last: A Nominee For Administrator Of Federal Procurement Policy, 33 N&CR
¶ 17 (Vern suggested that, for various reasons, including his late-in-theadministration nomination and confirmation, the new Administrator could
“identify some long-standing policy issues and set people to work developing a
set of discussion papers that could be the foundation for future policy analyses
and initiatives” or, maybe “should spend his term going around and talking
to people, in the style of Steve Kelman, asking about what concerns them,
soliciting input, and trying to prepare us all to talk and discuss when times
are less fraught.” Among other things, Ralph Nash added “the dire need for
thinking about contracting for services.”)
B. Focus on the Acquisition Workforce. Of course, Administrator
Wooten has been clear in his interest in strengthening and supporting the
acquisition workforce. There’s plenty to keep him busy, and a sampling of
issues (other than counting full-time-equivalents or FTE’s) might include:
• Gaps? See, generally, DOD Acquisition Workforce Has Gaps in Business Acumen, but Extent Is Unclear, 61 GC ¶ 187(c); Laura Werber, et al., An
Assessment of Gaps in Business Acumen and Knowledge of Industry Within the
Defense Acquisition Workforce (“[T]he lack of standardized definitions obscures
the need for knowledge related to business acumen, industry operations,
and industry motivation, and while knowledge gaps appear to exist in these
areas, the lack of requirements and desired proficiencies further hinders an
estimation of the gaps’ extent.” Among other gaps, the report addresses risk
management, earned value management, financial practices, supply chain
management, small business, agile development, cybersecurity, knowledge
of incentives that drive corporate decision-making, and “other important
types of business-related knowledge: negotiation, developing and understanding requirements, and cost and price analysis.”), www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR2825.html. (Along those lines, on April 22, 2019, the Board
of Standards Review of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
accredited the National Contract Management Association’s (NCMA’s) Contract Management Standard™ (CMS™) as an American National Standard
(ANS). At some point, it would be interesting to see DAU, FAI, and NCMA
make a concerted effort to align their professional standards.)
• Hiring, Recruiting, Outsourcing? Administrator Wooten may also
be interested in how agencies exploit hiring flexibilities and do (and don’t) continue to outsource the procurement function. See, e.g., DOD Should Monitor
Use Of Acquisition Workforce Hiring Flexibilities, 61 GC ¶ 248 (GAO reported
that, for fiscal years 2014 through 2018, “DOD used hiring flexibilities for 90
percent of its approximately 44,000 civilian acquisition workforce hiring ac-
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tions,” then raised that figure to 95 percent in FY 2018); GAO-19-509, Defense
Acquisition Workforce: DOD Increased Use of Human Capital Flexibilities
but Could Improve Monitoring, www.gao.gov/assets/710/700927.pdf; Industry Group Suggests Limiting USAID Use Of Contractor COs, 61 GC ¶ 243
(referencing the USAID proposal “to designate personal services contractors
(PSCs) and cooperating country national (CCN) PSCs as USAID warranted
contracting officers and agreement officers”); 61 GC ¶ 189(d) (“The proposed
rule would amend the USAID Acquisition Regulation (AIDAR) to ‘address
a shortage of U.S. direct-hire staff ’ and to ‘bolster the Agency to succeed in
terms of building long-term, host country technical capacity to materially
assist the Missions with procurement responsibility.’”); 84 Fed. Reg. 27745
(June 14, 2019). See also, Air Force, DOD Face Challenges Establishing New
Space Agencies, Witnesses Testify, 61 GC ¶ 114; DOD Does Not Know Scope Of
Space System Acquisition Workforce, 61 GC ¶ 92; GAO-19-240, Defense Space
Systems: DOD Should Collect and Maintain Data on Its Space Acquisition
Workforce, (“DOD does not routinely monitor the size, mix, or location of the
military and civilian workforce supporting its space-related acquisition programs.”) https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-240.
• Industry Exchange Programs? We agree with those clambering
for increased government-industry exchange programs. DBB Urges More
Industry-Government Personnel Exchanges, 61 GC ¶ 203 (DOD “would
benefit from exchange programs which explore streamlined, nontraditional
pathways to bring critical skills into service, expanding access to outside
expertise, and devising new public-private partnerships to work with small
companies, start-ups, and universities.”), DBB FY 19-01, Defense Acquisition Industry-Government Exchange: Recommendations to reduce barriers to
industry-government personnel exchanges, https://dbb.defense.gov/Reports/;
see also, DOD Industry Exchange Program (IEP) (“groundbreaking program
will serve as a platform for DOD and private sector participants to (a) gain a
better understanding of, and perspective on, each other’s business operations
and challenges, and (b) share innovative and cost-saving practices.”), https://
asc.army.mil/web/career-development/programs/dod-iep/.
• A Different Perspective: Administrator Wooten might also take
to heart (with a grain of salt, of course) Vern Edwards’ unvarnished assessment of most of the current workforce initiatives. Vernon J. Edwards, Sad
Commentary: Rules, Or The Lack Thereof, Won’t Make Acquisition Agile And
Innovative, 33 N&CR ¶ 5 (emphasis added):
We do not need reform. We need a paradigm shift. The Government
cannot fix acquisition and make the contracting process more
agile, innovative, and responsive to mission needs by writing and
revising rules, publishing slogans, and demanding ever more
status and progress reports. It needs a smart, professionally
educated, well-trained, and motivated workforce that is
steeped in concepts and principles, instead of rules, and able
to ply them in order to get things done…. Create a National
Acquisition Academy and educate and develop cadres of senior
executives who will go out to the field and remake acquisition. Stop
enacting procedurally prescriptive laws and regulations that set
protest traps….
Real progress toward making acquisition more agile and innovative
and responsive to our dire national security situation will begin
when the bureaucratic powers see for themselves, and convince
Congress, that the time has come to (1) develop a truly professional
© 2020 Thomson Reuters
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acquisition workforce and (2) rethink their 19th century ideas about
how acquisitions should be done....

C. No Shortage of Items On the Menu: The Section 809 Panel. We
have now had a year to digest the extensive (and, gratifyingly, well-written
and accessible) final Section 809 Panel report. (Recall that NDAA Section 809
for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, required the Secretary of Defense
to establish an advisory panel on streamlining and codifying acquisition
regulations. The massive study panel generated prodigious amounts of work
(and ideas) related to five target areas: (1) establishing and administering
appropriate buyer and seller relationships; (2) improving the functioning
of the system; (3) ensuring the continuing financial and ethical integrity
of defense procurement programs; (4) protecting the best interests of DoD;
and (5) eliminating any regulations that are unnecessary for the purposes
described.) See generally, https://section809panel.org. We’re confident that,
if Administrator Wooten runs out of ideas or initiatives, there are plenty
of thought-provoking panel recommendations (with, of course, voluminous
supporting research) that Congress has not yet addressed. Section 809 Panel
Recommends Broad Reforms To DOD Acquisition System, 61 GC ¶ 29.
D. Consider Metrics (or Performance Measurement). We continue
to hope for acquisition leadership that, rather than obsessing about (often
artificially) low prices, will focus on, among other things, value for money,
customer satisfaction, and life cycle cost (or total cost of ownership). In other
words, we hope Administrator Wooten turns the lens to what matters to requirements generators and agency heads, rather than what’s easy to measure
or what’s emphasized by pre-existing legal regimes (such as, for example,
Nunn-McCurdy breaches). See, e.g., Moshe Schwartz & Charles V. O’Connor,
Congressional Research Service Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy Act:
Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress (May 12, 2016) (“The NunnMcCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. § 2433) requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to
report to Congress whenever a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP)
experiences cost overruns that exceed certain thresholds.” One wonders as
to the utility of this dominant metric when, as CRS acknowledges: “Unrealistically optimistic cost estimates [an all-too-frequent occurrence] can make
future cost growth almost inevitable, setting the stage for future NunnMcCurdy breaches.”), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41293.pdf. It’s a steep
hill to climb (but our sense is that former DUSD(AT&L) Frank Kendall laid
at least some of the groundwork with his annual performance assessments).
For a cautionary note, however, see, generally, RAND Highlights Challenges
To DOD Use Of Data Analytics For Acquisition, 61 GC ¶ 251, Philip S. Anton,
et al., Assessing the Use of Data Analytics in Department of Defense Acquisition (RAND 2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10085.html.
Among other things, RAND notes that, while “DoD has made progress in
improving its data and analytic capabilities[, …] data governance is maturing, and pockets of analytic capabilities exist[,… a]ttempts to apply moreadvanced commercial data analytics approaches to DoD acquisition data are
just beginning.” Further (with emphasis added):
•

Some of the biggest barriers to expanding and refining the use of
data analytics in the acquisition sphere include the lack of data
sharing because of cultural, security, and micromanagement concerns; inconsistent data access across the DoD and for
FFRDCs and support contractors; and difficulty installing modern
analytic software because of security concerns.
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•

Long-term investments and strategic planning are needed
— both for data governance and for analytic capabilities — as
well as concerted efforts by Congress and the DoD to address the
culture of not sharing data.

•

Expectations of what data analytics can do for DoD acquisition need to be moderated. Most of the problematic programs
examined had issues stemming from strategic acquisition decisions rather than from a lack of data analytics; data analysis may
or may not be equally weighted against other factors that DoD
leadership must consider when making decisions.

No one said it would be easy. This year reminded us that there’s always
another data point demonstrating the difficulties DOD (and, more broadly,
government agencies) face(s) with regard to data-driven decision-making.
Consider, for example:
• DoD’s experience with contractor business system reviews. DCMA
Needs To Track Contractor Business System Reviews, 61 GC ¶ 43; GAO-19-212,
Contractor Business Systems: DOD Needs Better Information to Monitor and
Assess Review Process, www.gao.gov/assets/700/696801.pdf (“DOD currently
lacks a mechanism based on relevant and reliable information, such as the
number of [contractor business system] reviews that are outstanding, the
risk level assigned to those systems, and the resources available to conduct
such reviews....” Not surprisingly, among other things, too few reviews have
been conducted “due, in part, to the need for [DoD] to reduce its backlog on
completing incurred cost audits.”)
• DoD’s inability to track or validate promised energy savings. DOD Cannot Determine ESPC Savings, Benefit, 61 GC ¶ 53; Report DODIG-2019-058,
Summary and Follow-up Report on Audits of DoD Energy Savings Performance Contracts, (February 14, 2019) (In summarizing eight prior GAO,
DoD OIG, and Army Audit Agency reports, the DOD IG found that, despite
acknowledged progress, “the Government did not know whether it received
contractor‑claimed energy savings and whether the ESPC program was
cost effective.”), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/19/2002090670/-1/-1/1/
DODIG-2019-058.PDF.
• Nor should we expect OT’s (discussed at greater length below) to tell
a different story. DOD Lacks Reliable Data On OTA Use, CRS Says, 61 GC ¶
66 (CRS cautioned that current data “may not accurately reflect the extent
to which nontraditional contractors are engaged in OT agreements. … Other
analysts … suggested that DOD does not accurately and consistently track
OTA data….”), Moshe Schwartz & Heidi M. Peters, CRS Report R45521, Department of Defense Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis,
and Issues for Congress, (Updated February 22, 2019) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/R45521.pdf.
Low hanging fruit? Maybe the best starting point is small and simple,
something as easy as trying to learn from prior experience. GAO: KC-46 Tanker
Should Issue Lessons Learned For Fixed-Price Development Contracts, 61 GC ¶
174; GAO-19-480, KC-46 Tanker Modernization: Aircraft Delivery Has Begun,
but Deficiencies Could Affect Operations and Will Take Time to Correct, (DoD
“should ensure that the KC-46 program office disseminates insights … [regarding the] contracting and sustainment planning experiences for consideration
by acquisition programs, in particular those considering a fixed-price-type
development contract or a commercial derivative aircraft.”), https://www.gao.
© 2020 Thomson Reuters
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gov/products/GAO-19-480. In a different context, but poignantly reminding
us of the need to learn from experiences rather than simply repeat them, see
Vernon J. Edwards, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, The C-5A, and Acquisition Innovation: What Lessons Can We Learn?, 33 N&CR ¶ 21:
The C-5A story shows us that acquisition is not just a process
governed by laws and regulations and conducted by people working
in bureaucracies, and it is far more complex than mere rules and
contracts. It is an intricate and dynamic political, social, and
economic system of bureaucracies, individuals, personalities, world
views, cultures, superstitions, mythologies, pathologies, dogmas,
concepts, vague notions, principles, and policies, all circumscribed
by energy fields of genius, stupidity, indifference, criminality, time,
and chance. You cannot just tinker with a specification of this or that
facet of the system and hope to make the system behave the way
you would wish. Anyone who thinks that statutes, regulations, and
the application of “sound” management practices and procedures
can “fix” acquisition simply does not understand the problem.

It’s a big government; and challenges differ. At the same time, let’s be
clear that DoD is well ahead of many civilian agencies on some of these topics,
although some, including GSA, appear to be making investments with an eye
towards more strategic decision-making. DOE Should Improve Contractor
Cost Performance Reporting, GAO Says, 61 GC ¶ 64; GAO-19-5, Department
of Energy: Performance Evaluations Could Better Assess Management and Operating Contractor Costs, (although, in a perverse sort of way, we are inclined
to applaud DOE to the extent that their “reports provided less information
on M&O contractors’ cost performance than on contractors’ technical and
administrative performance....” Yes, cost performance matters, but shouldn’t
we prioritize contract completion, customer satisfaction, and achievements
such as “production progress” and “scientific discoveries?” Is comparing the
number of pages for each type of analysis meaningful?), https://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-19-5. See also, MAS Transactional Data Reporting Has Limited
Use, Imposes Significant Burden, Industry Group Warns, 61 GC ¶ 226 (among
other things, “in today’s dynamic marketplace prices can change daily, and
agencies using the data may make erroneous comparisons because of outdated
information. These misunderstandings could slow negotiations and increase
the administrative costs for contracts…. [To the extent that] TDR does not
provide meaningful data related to the quality of the item[, the] system drives
the Government towards decisions made on the lowest price, regardless of
the other criteria that impact a buying decision.”) Coalition for Government
Procurement Comments (July 29, 2019) http://thecgp.org/images/CoalitionTDR-Final-Comments-7-29-19.pdf. See also, GAO Questions Post-Disaster
Contract Tracking, 61 GC ¶ 130; GAO-19-281, 2017 Disaster Contracting:
Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Post-Disaster Contracts to Support Response and Recovery, (“the full extent of post-disaster contracting related to
the 2017 disasters is unknown”), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-281.
Finally, to the extent we’re addressing data, it’s impossible not to mention one
of the year’s stranger stories. DATA Act Pilot Failed To Assess Reduction In
Contractor Reporting Burden, 61 GC ¶ 134 (Unlike grantees, “[n]o contractors
participated in a voluntary pilot program for a centralized procurement data
portal....[OMB] still does not have information from stakeholders that could
help inform the expansion.”); GAO-19-299, Pilot Effectively Tested Approaches
for Reducing Reporting Burden for Grants but Not for Contracts; https://www.
gao.gov/products/GAO-19-299.
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IV. NUMBERS, THE BURN RATE, PROCUREMENT DATA: WHAT
TO MAKE OF VARIOUS TRENDS?
A. Better Late Than Never: The Money Keeps Flowing. Although
we began calendar year 2019 in (a sustained) shutdown, continuing resolutions and pre-Christmas legislation largely averted a repeat for Fiscal Year
2020. But see Subcommittee Report Highlights Government Shutdown Costs,
61 GC ¶ 276 (Senate Committee survey “suggests that the three most recent
Government shutdowns—in fiscal years 2014, 2018 and 2019—cost taxpayers at least $3.7 billion in back pay to furloughed workers and at least $338
million in other costs such as lost revenue, administrative work and late fees
on interest payments[.]”); President Signs Continuing Resolution, Industry
Group Offers Shutdown Guidance, 61 GC ¶ 286; PSC Offers Guidance to
Mitigate Effects of a Government Shutdown (September 23, 2019), https://
www.pscouncil.org/a/News_Releases/2019/PSC_Offers_Guidance_to_Mitigate_Effects__of_a_Government_Shutdown.aspx. For a less gloomy (but
transparently uncertain) perspective, see Report Finds Mixed Evidence Of
Harm From Continuing Resolutions On DOD Weapon Contracts, 61 GC ¶ 21;
Stephanie Young & J. Michael Gilmore, RAND, Operating Under a Continuing
Resolution: A Limited Assessment of Effects on Defense Procurement Contract
Awards, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2200/
RR2263/RAND_RR2263.pdf (“The results of our analysis are mixed. They do
not provide strong evidence that CRs are causing delays and cost increases;
because of their limitations, however, our results also do not provide definitive evidence that such negative effects are not occurring.”).
B. Are the Boom Years Here to Stay? Unlike most of the past decade,
the procurement dollars seem to be flowing relatively freely (despite prodigious deficit spending), and procurement spending appears, once again, to be
on the rise. Fiscal 2018 procurement spending, at $559 billion, was the third
consecutive annual increase, increasing by $46.3 billion over the previous year
and representing the largest number since $562 billion in FY2010. See, e.g.,
Bloomberg Government, BGOV200: Federal Industry Leaders 2019, https://
about.bgov.com/bgov200/. Last year’s chapter indicated our curiosity with
regard to USASpending.gov’s new DataLab (still in Beta), and we had high
hopes to the extent that it offered a broad range of eye-catching graphics and
insights. (Among other things, we discussed, at length the feature: Contract
Spending Analysis: How has federal contract spending changed over time?)
Alas, that section does not appear to have been updated in the last year (and
appears to have been frozen at March 31, 2018; yes, that’s 2018, not 2019).
Meanwhile, consistent with past experience that most concatenated federal
procurement data should be viewed with some amount of skepticism, GAO
highlighted that: “The amount of foreign end products purchased could be
greater than reported in FPDS-NG … due to reporting errors and system
limitations….” GAO Finds Inconsistent Buy American Guidance, Inaccurate
Procurement Data, 61 GC ¶ 2; GAO-19-17, Buy American Act, Actions Needed
to Improve Exception and Waiver Reporting and Selected Agency Guidance,
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-17.
C. Growth Below the Radar: High Volume, Lower Dollar Procurement: Waiting for the New Micro-purchase and Simplified Acquisition
Thresholds. Last year we suggested that one of the year’s most dramatic policy
and practice changes – in terms of impacting the broadest segment of the acquisition community and the private sector – would fly largely under the radar, …
and that was the whole point. Pursuant to the 2019 National Defense Autho© 2020 Thomson Reuters

13-8

NOTES
rization Act (NDAA), Section 821, the micro-purchase threshold experienced
a dramatic, greater-than-inflation-adjusted, statutory bump, up to $10,000 for
all agencies (including DoD). Congress Passes FY 2019 NDAA, 60 GC ¶ 241. We
noted that we’ve come a long way since the late 1990’s, when the micro-purchase
authority was established, as part of the reform and streamlining movement, and
dramatically expanded reliance on the Governmentwide commercial purchase
card (yes, the then-nascent Government charge card). DoD Gears Up for Simplified Micropurchases, 40 GC ¶ 192. Also, the statutory simplified acquisition
threshold was slated to increase Government-wide from $150,000 (which has
been inflation adjusted) to $250,000. As of the new year, however, neither the
default micro-purchase nor the simplified acquisition thresholds in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR 2.101) had been fully implemented (or increased).
Proposed Rule To Raise FAR Simplified Acquisition, Micro-purchase Thresholds,
61 GC ¶ 308 (“The proposed rule would also ‘replace non-statutory, stated dollar
thresholds that are intended to correspond with the MPT and SAT, with the text
‘micro-purchase threshold’ and ‘simplified acquisition threshold.’ This change
‘will ease maintenance of regulations, given the likelihood of future changes to
the threshold amounts,’ the proposed rule states.”); 84 Fed. Reg. 52420 (Oct. 2,
2019); FAR Micropurchase And Simplified Acquisition Thresholds Raised For
Emergency, Cyberattack Response, 61 GC ¶ 147.
D. More Other Transactions Activity? Although they still do not account for a statistically significant percentage of federal procurement dollars,
reliance on other transactions appears to be increasing. From FY 2016 through
2018, the “total number of new prototype other transactions increased five-fold
from 34 to 173[,]” and “obligations made on prototype other transactions nearly
tripled from $1.4 billion to $3.7 billion.” One of many unique nuggets that the
report unearthed was that: “The Army was responsible for over two-thirds of
the new awards and actions made from fiscal years 2016 through 2018—valued at nearly $5.3 billion—but some of these were awarded on behalf of other
DOD components, such as the Air Force, Navy, and Defense Innovation Unit.”
GAO-20-84, Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Use of Other Transactions for Prototype
Projects Has Increased (November 22, 2019); DOD’s Other Transactions Usage
Has Significantly Increased, GAO Finds, 61 GC ¶ 356. Of course, that doesn’t
mean that OT practice has been standardized or optimized; it’s still evolving.
Richard Dunn, Feature Comment: Thirty Years of Other Transactions, 61 GC ¶
347 (“[A]n alternative acquisition system based on OTs is overdue. It is time
to create the new system, not merely view OTs as ‘just another tool.’ Let the
two systems [OT’s and the traditional acquisition system] operate in parallel
and make judgments once adequate comparative data have been gathered and
analyzed.”). See also, Ralph C. Nash, Protesting Other Transactions: District
Court Jurisdiction, 33 N&CR ¶ 39 (asserting that “competitors for OT contracts
should have some place to go to ensure that the agency has followed the rules
and treated the offerors fairly. Until Congress decides otherwise, that is now
the district court.”); Ralph C. Nash, Postscript: Other Transactions, 33 N&CR
¶ 1 (“While OT contracts are the current solution to many problems, there is
still a lot to be learned. Thus, the entire process is a laboratory project.”).
E. Fewer Bid Protests? The volume of GAO bid protests again declined
in FY 2019, and the single-year decrease was far more significant (at sixteen
percent) than typical fluctuations (in either direction, of under ten percent).
The number of protests filed, 2,198, is markedly down from the recent high of
2,789 in FY 2016 (and, of course, a far cry from the 1993 of peak of more than
3,300 protests). GAO Bid Protest Sustain Rate Drops Again As Number Of
Cases Filed Drops In FY 2019, 61 GC ¶ 328; GAO-20-220SP, GAO Bid Protest
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Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2019 (November 5, 2019) (“[T]he
most prevalent reasons for sustaining protests during the 2019 fiscal year
were: (1) unreasonable technical evaluation; (2) inadequate documentation of
the record; (3) flawed selection decision; (4) unequal treatment; and (5) unreasonable cost or price evaluation.”); Jerald S. Howe, Jr., James J. McCullough,
Michael J. Anstett & Anayansi Rodriguez, Feature Comment: An Analysis Of
GAO’s 2018 Bid Protest Statistics—Regression Toward The Mean, 61 GC ¶ 35
(analyzing the prior year’s statistics). See also, the materials at Chapter 10, as
well as Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: Administrative Conference
Of The United States Launches Study Of Agency-Level Bid Protests, 61 GC ¶
239 (“The goal will be to develop recommendations regarding key aspects of
agency-level bid protests, recommendations which the Administrative Conference can put forward to make agency-level protests a more vital, efficient
part of the federal procurement system.”).
F. Less Suspension and Debarment Activity? Following a trend
begun in FY 2014, the total number of contractor suspension or debarment
actions declined, (for a total of 480 suspensions, 1,542 proposed debarments,
and 1,334 debarments). The Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee (ISDC) reminds readers, however, that this activity is nearly double
that reported in FY 2009, and that these numbers do not reflect the full
scope of relevant activities, including “proactive engagements” by entities
and individuals. ISDC FY 2018 Report On Suspensions, Debarments Shows
Continued Downward Trend, 61 GC ¶ 329. (Note that the link to the official
report was broken during the beta-SAM launch/conversion, discussed, supra.)
G. Looking Behind the Curtain: Contractor Ownership. Opaque
ownership, or the use of shell companies, which obscures contractor ownership, appears to have finally caught GAO and DoD’s attention and worked
its way into the compliance narrative. Related concerns range from displacement of small or disadvantaged firms, potentially disguised conflicts of
interest, to foreign influence and control. GAO reported that “[DOD] faces
several types of financial and nonfinancial fraud and national security risks
posed by contractors with opaque ownership.” In other words, currently, “it
[is] difficult for DOD to determine which entities and individuals ultimately
own or control its contractors[.]” GAO-20-106, Defense Procurement: Ongoing
DOD Fraud Risk Assessment Efforts Should Include Contractor Ownership
(November 2019, public version of the more sensitive report to DoD), https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-106; DoD Needs to Assess Contractor Ownership Fraud, 61 GC ¶ 355. See also, Proposed Rules Would Overhaul, Expand
CFIUS Authority, 61 GC ¶ 279 (to comprehensively implement the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) and to better
address national security concerns); GAO Weighs DOD Offshoring Risks And
Benefits, 61 GC ¶ 267; GAO-19-516, Defense Supplier Base: Challenges and
Policy Considerations Regarding Offshoring and Foreign Investment Risks,
www.gao.gov/assets/710/701170.pdf.
V. THE FUTURE OF SMALL BUSINESS CONTRACTING: TIME TO
DISCUSS SME CONTRACTING?
A. A middle ground? GAO raised a number of fascinating questions
regarding the efficacy and future of small business procurement when it concluded (consistent with what many assumed,) that “a very small percentage
of the small businesses that were awarded set-aside contracts in fiscal year
2008 grew to midsized in subsequent years and continued to receive any
© 2020 Thomson Reuters

13-10

NOTES
type of contract.” Few Small Contractors Grow Into Mid-Sized Firms And
Continue Receiving Contracts, GAO Finds, 61 GC ¶ 283; GAO-19-523, Federal
Contracting: Awards to Mid-Sized Businesses and Options for Increasing Their
Opportunities, www.gao.gov/assets/710/700999.pdf. For the most part, GAO
seemed uninterested in the rest of the world’s procurement experience, where
most other countries long have focused on SME’s (small and medium sized
enterprises) rather than the US-system’s polar or rigidly binary universe
of small and other-than-small. See, generally, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), SMEs in Public Procurement: Practices and Strategies for Shared Benefits (October 2018), https://www.oecd.org/
publications/smes-in-public-procurement-9789264307476-en.htm. See also,
Franklin C. Turner, Alexander W. Major & Cara A. Wulf., Feature Comment:
New Year, New Rules—Changes Are Coming To The FAR’s Small Business
Subcontracting Limits And Nonmanufacturer Rule, 61 GC ¶ 20 (“[S]ince the
passage of the 2013 NDAA, contractors and Government personnel alike
have struggled to comply with an amalgam of inconsistent rules regarding
the extent to which a small business may subcontract work under a federal
small business set-aside contract.”)
B. What’s the Goal, Anyway? Just meeting the goal? Although small
business programs generally enjoy bipartisan support, small business advocates
raise various procedural and eligibility complaints, while others more broadly
question “the programs’ effectiveness, in terms of both promoting small business
opportunities to win federal contracts and a more diversified, robust economy.”
We remain skeptical that “the relative success or failure of federal efforts to enhance small business contracting opportunities [can best be assessed simply by
determining] whether the federal government and individual federal agencies
meet the [seemingly arbitrary] procurement goals in the annual Small Business
Goaling Report.” CRS Surveys Criticism Of Small Business Programs, SBA Goals,
61 GC ¶ 80; CRS Report R45576, An Overview of Small Business Contracting
(July 3, 2019) https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45576. Still, it’s better (for most contracting professionals) when the government meets (rather than
fails to meet) the Congressionally-mandated goals. Government Meets FY 2018
Small Business Goal With Record Sum, 61 GC ¶ 205 (“After failing to meet the
Government-wide 23-percent goal for eight years, the Government has now met
the goal in FYs 2013-2018.” Alas, not all was roses. “The Government missed its
five- and three-percent goals for women-owned small businesses and Historically
Underutilized Business Zone firms[.]”)
VI. THE LPTA SAGA ENDURES.
The primary Star Wars big screen triple-trilogy story-arc, which spanned
an entire generation, may have run its course and reached its conclusion (or
not), but DoD continues to keep the debate alive with regard to proper use of
Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) procurement in FAR and DFARS
Part 15. ABA Section, PSC Calls for Harmonization of FAR, DFARS, LPTA
Restrictions, 61 GC ¶ 359 (also discussing comments from Women Impacting
Public Policy (WIPP) and the Project on Government Oversight (POGO)).
FAR Rule On LPTA Process Will Not Be Enacted in Statutory Timeframe,
61 GC ¶ 296 (“GAO found that DOD components used the LPTA process for
about 25 percent of competitive contracts and orders valued at $5 million
or more in FY 2018[, while o]nly seven percent of civilian agency contracts
used the LPTA process.”); GAO-19-691, Federal Contracting: Information on
Agencies’ Use of the Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Process, www.gao.
gov/assets/710/701773.pdf; Proposed FAR Rule Would Limit LPTA Use By
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Civilian Agencies, 61 GC ¶ 298 (seeking to avoid, “to the maximum extent
practicable, LPTA use for procuring certain knowledge-based services and
supplies”); 84 Fed. Reg. 52425 (Oct. 2, 2019); DOD Should Harmonize LPTA
Restrictions With FAR Council, Industry Group Says, 61 GC ¶ 38 (PSC advocates for application of the restrictions on LPTA use to services contracts
government-wide).
VII. A BLEAK HORIZON SUGGESTS A BRIGHT FUTURE FOR
SUSTAINABLE PROCUREMENT.
The history of the federal government’s environmentally preferable or
green procurement policies has been a rocky one, and, despite sporadic initiatives (including, most recently, Obama administration Executive Orders), still
does not appear to feature prominently on the current procurement landscape.
See, generally, FAR Part 23. With the new year, Australia’s experience – unprecedented wild fires (across an area basically the size of the continental
United States), military reserve deployments for firefighting, population displacements, soot contamination of air and water, temperatures rising to 120 degrees Fahrenheit, and extinction-level threats to various species – potentially
offers a sobering harbinger for the future of climate change. While we do not
expect dramatic progress on initiatives to address these issues in 2020 (either
here in the US or globally), it is only a matter of time until government(s) will
need to exert leadership in this arena. At a minimum, we expect (again, at
some point in the future) greater consideration of externalities (for example,
emissions) as part of value for money or life cycle cost analysis in greater
numbers of procurements. Outside the U.S., momentum is (slowly, laboriously) building around the need for more sustainable procurement, with the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) leading the
organizational and thematic discussion with an eye towards seeking “policy
coherence” on these issues. (Keep in mind that this sustainability agenda is
much broader than “green procurement,” including many topics we typically
consider social and economic policies, such as gender equality, but also many
topics we consider “compliance-related,” such as bribery (and foreign corrupt practices), human trafficking, and money laundering. “The Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) are broad and ambitious, calling on all countries
– be they upper, middle or low income – to make tangible improvements to
the lives of their citizens. The g
 oals e ncompass social, environmental and
economic aspects.”) http://www.oecd.org/dac/sustainable-development-goals.
htm; Green Public Procurement, https://www.oecd.org/gov/public-procurement/
green/. If you want to get ahead of the information curve, consider, among innumerable other options, Jason J. Czarnezki, Green Public Procurement: Legal
Instruments for Promoting Environmental Interests in the United States and
the European Union (Dissertation, Uppsala Universitet, 2019); International
Monetary Fund, The Economics of Climate, Finance and Development (December 2019) (“Simply put, climate is the biggest risk the world faces. What
can we do to move from talk to action?”), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/fandd/2019/12/pdf/fd1219.pdf; or David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable
Earth: Life After Warming (2019).
VIII. A STRANGE DATAPOINT IN THE EVOLUTION OF
ENHANCED DEBRIEFINGS.
One of the issues we didn’t see coming in 2019 was a slice of the (most
recent) protest of DoD’s JEDI cloud computing procurement, brought by disappointed offeror Amazon Web Services (now proceeding in the U.S. Court of
© 2020 Thomson Reuters
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Federal Claims, raising issues largely unrelated to the prior GAO and COFC
protests previously brought by Oracle). Part of that protest complains about
the manner in which DoD conducted Amazon’s post-award debriefing. Among
other things, the (redacted) complaint alleges:
Despite the significance of the JEDI procurement - which had been
years in the making and had a potential ceiling of $10 billion - on
the same day DOD announced its award decision, DoD provided
AWS a written debriefing ... and advised AWS that it had two
business days to submit written questions based on the debriefing,
foreclosing the opportunity for AWS to request and receive an
in-person debriefing….
DoD [then] failed to provide reasonable responses to relevant
questions about whether source selection procedures contained
in the solicitation, applicable regulation, and other applicable
authorities were followed, … In fact, DoD did not provide a
substantive response to a single one of the 265 questions that
AWS timely submitted, leaving AWS in the dark about DoD’s
explanations for the substantive issues for which AWS raised
concern in the debriefing questions.

See (redacted) complaint, Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. U.S., Case 1:19-cv01796-PEC (Filed December 9, 2019) Section G, pages 89, et seq. (emphasis
added); Jared Serbu, Why DoD may have given Amazon every reason to protest
JEDI, Federal News Network (December 18, 2019). See also, Amazon Files
Protest With COFC Against DOD JEDI Cloud Award, 61 GC ¶ 340. Granted,
at this point, these are mere allegations, but it sounds like the debriefing
following DoD’s high-value, high-profile procurement is more likely to serve
as a lesson learned or case study than a model for other DoD contracting
officials, particularly in light of increased expectations associated with “enhanced debriefings.” We are reminded of the first recommendation from the
2018 RAND Bid Protest report:
A major concern from the private sector is the quality of post-award
debriefings. The consensus among companies is that the quality
and number of post-award debriefings vary significantly. The worst
debriefings were characterized as being skimpy, adversarial, and
evasive or as failing to provide required reasonable responses to
relevant questions. In desperation, unsuccessful offerors may
submit a bid protest to obtain government documents that delineate
the rationale for the contract award.… [I]n most cases, too little
information and evasive/adversarial debriefings will lead to a bid
protest. Our recommendation is to consider having DoD adopt a
debriefing process similar to the U.S. Air Force’s extended briefing
process.

Mark V. Arena, et al., RAND, Assessing Bid Protests of U.S. Department of
Defense Procurements: Identifying Issues, Trends, and Drivers, https://www.
rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2356.html; see also, DoD Class-Deviation
2018-O011, Enhanced Postaward Debriefing Rights (March 22, 2018), https://
www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA000563-18-DPAP.pdf; Joseph R.
Berger, Feature Comment: Developments Affecting DOD Bid Protests, 61 GC
¶ 113 (“With new debriefing procedures and other potential future improvements, DOD may be leading the way toward better debriefings Governmentwide.… Unsuccessful offerors on contracts with DOD can use the newly
adopted procedures to obtain valuable and necessary information to help
them better understand the agency’s reasoning and decision, why they lost
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the competition and how they can improve their proposals, and whether there
is a valid basis for a bid protest.”) More broadly, DoD’s JEDI cloud computing procurement-and-protest saga continues, in an extraordinary example
of a procurement where, among other things, two major competitors both
alleged (at different stages of the process) the existence of dramatic, facially
compelling, case study-worthy conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Developments:
DOD Awards JEDI Cloud Contract to Microsoft, Bypassing Amazon, Oracle,
61 GC ¶ 324(d); New Defense Secretary To Review JEDI Procurement, 61 GC
¶ 232; Oracle Was Not Prejudiced By Alleged Errors In JEDI Procurement,
COFC Holds, 61 GC ¶ 230; Oracle Am., Inc. v. U.S., 2019 WL 3385953 (Fed.
Cl. July 19, 2019) (currently on appeal, 61 GC ¶ 268(f)), but see, Ralph C.
Nash, Hiring A Member of the Source Selection Team: Not A Recommended
Practice, 33 N&CR ¶ 54 (“If you asked any knowledgeable person whether a
company should hire a member of the Government source selection team in
the middle of a competition, you would get a resounding NO!”); Comp. Gen.
Denies Oracle Protest Of Single-Award Approach For JEDI Cloud IDIQ, 61
GC ¶ 8; Oracle Am., Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-416657 et al., 2018 CPD ¶ 391.
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